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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Income Taxation-Conversion of Capital Gains Into
Ordinary Income in Collapsible Corporations
Taxpayers, in 1948, formed two corporations and constructed
two apartment houses financed by the Federal Housing Authority.
In 1950, taxpayers sold their stock in the two corporations and re-
ported the profit as capital gain. Tax Court held that the two cor-
porations were collapsible and the shareholders realized ordinary
income on the sale of stock and distributions from the corporations.
Held affirmed. Under the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341, gain from
the distributions and sale of stock was ordinary income when more
than seventy per cent of the gain was attributable to the constructed
property, even though sale of corporate assets would have produced
capital gain had no corporation existed. Braunstein v. Commissioner,
305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962).
The problem presented in this case is whether gain realized
through a collapsible corporation should be ordinary income if such
gain realized by an individual would be capital gain. The solution
to the problem lies in the intent of Congress in its enactment of
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 341. In essence, this section was enacted
to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain through
the vehicle of incorporation. Axelrad, Recent Developments in
Collapsible Corporations, 36 TAXES 893, 894 (1958). The principal
case is an example of how a broad interpretation of the statute has
been used to convert capital gain into ordinary income.
Basically, the statute provides that if a corporation is formed or
availed of for the manufacture, construction, production, or pur-
chase of property with a view to the sale or exchange of stock by the
shareholders or a distribution by partial or complete liquidation of the
property before the realization of a substantial part of the income to
be derived from such property, the shareholder's gain will be treated
as gain from a non-capital asset. The statute attacks the gain on
the shareholder level and not the corporate level and, therefore, all
the gain is converted into ordinary income. Axelrad, Tax Advantages
and Pitfalls in Collapsible Corporations, 34 TAXES 841 (1956).
Even though the collapsible definition is met, section 341 does
not apply: (1) to the shareholder who does not own more than
five per cent of the stock; or (2) if not more than seventy per cent
of the gain realized in the taxable year is attributable to the collops-
ible property; or (3) if the gain is realized three years or more after
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completion of the property or its purchase. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 341(d) (1), (2), (3).
In 1958, Congress amended the statute and placed another
limitation on it. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 341(e). Subsection
(e) was enacted to provide relief from the collapsible rules in a few
situations where it was felt that the statute might operate to convert
bona fide capital gains into ordinary income. The cases prior to the
1958 amendment of subsection (e) generally hold that despite legis-
lative history, it is irrelevant that the shareholder would have enjoyed
capital gain rather than ordinary income had the corporate vehicle
not been employed. Glickman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1958); Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958);
Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election
and Collapsible Amendment, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1146, 1180 (1958).
A proposed revision for subsection (e) would "fragment" the
shareholder's gain, on liquidation of the corporation or the sale of
its stock, into ordinary income and capital gain components according
to the ratio of the appreciation inherent in the ordinary assets and
the capital assets hold by the corporation. SURREY & WARREN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1384 (1960 ed. 1962).
In contrast to that approach, the present subsection (e) uses an
"all or nothing" approach. Speaking generally, the subsection
provides that if more than fifteen per cent of the appreciation in
relation to the net worth of the corporation would be ordinary
income, then the subsection does not apply, and the gain is taxable
as ordinary income. However, if less than fifteen per cent of the
appreciation in relation to the net worth of the corporation would
be ordinary income, then the subsection does apply, and the gain
is given capital gain treatment. See SuRRY & WARREN, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION 1383 (1960 ed. 1962); Axelrad, Recent Devel-
opments in Collapsible Corporations, 36 TAXES 893, 911 (1958).
It should be observed that the determination of a subsection (e) asset
depends upon its status in the hands of either the corporation or the
shareholder of more than twenty per cent. Axelrad, Recent Devel-
opments in Collapsible Corporations, 36 TAXEs 893, 912 (1958).
Another problem is whether the taxpayer holds the property
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his business
within the meaning of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1231(b) (1) (B).
If so, the taxpayer is dealer and is subject to ordinary income. On
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the other hand, if the taxpayer is an investor, he is not subject to
ordinary income but can report the gain as capital gain. This
controversy of "dealer" or "investor" is held by the courts to be a
question of fact. Axelrad, Recent Developments in Collapsible
Corporation, 36 TAXES 893, 912 (1958).
In United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961), a tax-
payer purchased an unimproved lot for $42,500 in February 1954
and improved the lot at his expense of $2,000. The taxpayer later
formed a corporation with two others, each receiving one third of the
stock of the corporation. In October 1954, the corporation bought the
taxpayer's lot in consideration of a $25,000 note and two hundred
fifty shares of the corporation's stock with a value of $25,000. The
corporation began building an apartment building on the lot and
when it was seventy five per cent completed, in July 1955, the tax-
payer sold his stock for $100,000. The court held that where the
shareholder's gain would be taxable as a capital gain had he realized
it directly rather than through the corporate vehicle, the gain should
not receive collapsibe treatment.
The principal case criticized the Ivey case, supra, for misinter-
preting the statute and not recognizing or applying subsection (e).
In Commissioner v. Kelly, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961), the court
stated that in the field of tax legislation, dictionary-tested meanings
and common usuage must be used in interpreting statutes. In this
respect, the greatest objection to the decision in the Ivey case, supra,
is that it acts to invalidate subsection (e). In the Ivey case, supra,
the court reached a subsection (e) result, but the case enlarges the
protection afforded by the subsection. The case omits the refinements
and strict requirements of the subsection and goes beyond the "all
or nothing" approach of the subsection and permits the fragmenta-
tion approach. CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1128. It should
also be noted that subsection (e) was not applicable to the Ivey case,
supra, since the operative facts of the case had taken place before
its enactment. The principal case asserts that either the Ivey case,
supra, is correct and subsection (e) is unnecessary, or subsection (e)
should be held as overruling the Ivey decision. For this reason, the
court held against the Ivey decision and in favor of a strict interpreta-
tion of subsection (e).
The greatest objection to section 341 and subsection (e) is the
complexity that prevails throughout the entire section. The section
attempts to regulate by the use of specific percentages and in doing
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so, sets up complex standards which are difficult to apply. A simpler
approach to this problem might be the fragmentation of gain. At
any rate, it would appear that Congressional revision or amendment
will be necessary to alleviate the undue complication.
Frank Thomas Graff, Jr.
Income Tax-Nonrecognition of Gain Realized upon
Involuntary Conversion of Investment Property
Taxpayer, a corporation, realized gain upon the condemnation
of a building owned by the taxpayer and leased to a manufacturing
company. Taxpayer replaced the condemned property with another
building which was -easonably similar to the original building. The
replacement property was leased to a wholesale grocery business.
The Tax Court sustained the commissioner's determination of an
income tax deficiency based on taxpayer's failure to include in gross
income the gain realized on the condemnation. Held, reversed. Uses
of original property, which taxpayer leased to a tenant for manu-
facturing purposes, and replacement property, which was leased for
warehousing purposes, were "similar or related in service or use"
within the meaning of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1033 (a) (3) (A),
and taxpayer's gain on original property was exempt from taxation.
Loco REALTY Co. v. COMMISSIONER, 306 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1962).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that if property is
involuntarily converted as a result of its destruction, theft, or re-
quisition or condemnation, gain on the conversion need not be re-
cognized if the money subsequently obtained is used to purchase re-
placement property which is "similar or related in service or use."
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1033 (a) (3) (A). In determining
whether the replacement property fulfills the requirements of the
statute, the various courts of appeals have distinguished the cases
which involve a taxpayer-lessor and those which involve a taxpayer-
user. The situation in further complicated by the fact that the
courts are not in agreement as to what tests should be applied in
ascertaining whether the taxpayer-lessor is entitled to the nonrecogni-
tion of gain benefits. As a result of the holding in the principal case
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